Moral Hazard in Dynamic Risk Management

Dylan Possamai (Université Paris Dauphine - CEREMADE)
Thursday, April 30, 2015 - 4:00pm
TU Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 136, 10623 Berlin, Raum MA 041

We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can compute the quadratic variation of the output, but not the individual components. This leads to moral hazard with respect to the risk choices of the agent. Using a very recent theory of singular changes of measures for Ito processes, we formulate the principal-agent problem in this context, and solve it in the case of CARA preferences. In that case, the optimal contract is linear in these factors: the contractible sources of risk, including the output, the quadratic variation of the output and the cross-variations between the output and the contractible risk sources. Thus, path-dependent contracts naturally arise when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management.

This is a joint work with Nizar Touzi (CMAP, Ecole Polytechnique) and Jaksa Cvitanic (Caltech).